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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
 No. 17-2351 
 
___________ 
 
HEANYI JOSEPH OKORAFOR, 
                                               Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
_______________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
BIA No. A055-579-799 
(Immigration Judge: Walter A. Durling) 
______________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
 October 4, 2019 
 
 Before:  SHWARTZ, SCIRICA, and FUENTES, Circuit Judges. 
 
 (Opinion Filed:  October 24, 2019) 
 
 
________________ 
 
OPINION* 
________________ 
 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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SCIRICA, Circuit Judge 
 
 Heanyi Okorafor1 challenges the decisions of the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(“BIA”) and Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying deferral of removal under the Convention 
Against Torture (“CAT”), 8 C.F.R. § 208.17.2 For the reasons discussed below, we 
conclude that we lack subject-matter jurisdiction over the issues presented in this petition 
for review3 and will dismiss the petition in its entirety. 
Petitioner presents three arguments for our consideration: whether (1) the IJ and 
BIA applied an erroneous method of assessing credibility; (2) the IJ and BIA failed to 
provide Mr. Okorafor with an opportunity to present corroborating evidence and used the 
lack of such evidence to find he lacked credibility; and (3) the IJ and BIA denied him due 
process by allowing the credibility determination to affect their dispositions. Mr. 
Okorafor did not present these arguments before the BIA, where he was represented by 
counsel. Instead, Mr. Okorafor contended CAT deferral was erroneously denied because 
“[t]he Immigration Judge did not accord proper weight to the graphic proof presented to 
her.” J.A. 192. Within that context, Mr. Okorafor identified two other issues with the IJ’s 
decision: (a) the IJ erred in finding there was no medical documentation of the injuries 
Mr. Okorafor claimed were caused by torture and (b) the IJ erred in finding that certain 
discrepancies in Mr. Okorafor’s narrative were material. The BIA found these arguments 
meritless. 
                                              
1 Heanyi Okorafor is also known as Ifeanyi Okorafor. We refer to him as Mr. Okorafor. 
2 Mr. Okorafor originally petitioned for review of whether cancellation of removal was 
properly denied, but now concedes we cannot review this issue. Pet’r’s Br. 1. 
3 Subject-matter jurisdiction existed with the BIA under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b)(3). 
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We possess “jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1) to review a final order of the 
BIA denying CAT relief.” Myrie v. Attorney Gen., 855 F.3d 509, 515 (3d Cir. 2017).4 
But, “the statute constrains our jurisdiction to ‘constitutional claims or questions of law,’ 
as ‘factual or discretionary determinations are outside of our scope of review.’” Id. 
(quoting Pierre v. Attorney Gen., 528 F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 2008) (en banc)). 
 Although Mr. Okorafor has “dress[ed] up” his first two contentions “with legal 
clothing,” they are factual challenges. Pareja v. Attorney Gen., 615 F.3d 180, 187 (3d 
Cir. 2010) (citing Jarbough v. Attorney Gen., 483 F.3d 184, 189 (3d Cir. 2007)). Our 
decision in Abdulrahman v. Attorney General is instructive. 330 F.3d 587, 594–95 (3d 
Cir. 2003). In Pareja, we held that issues presented before the BIA that concerned 
credibility determinations and the sufficiency of the evidence did not fall within our 
jurisdiction merely because the petitioner contended before us that the incorrect burden of 
proof was used. Id. Similarly, Mr. Okorafor’s contentions before the BIA concerning the 
weight and sufficiency of the evidence, corroborating evidence, and credibility 
determinations cannot be recast as legal issues now that they are before us. We do not 
possess subject-matter jurisdiction to consider these issues as they concern factual or 
discretionary determinations by the IJ and BIA. 
Our jurisdiction is further constrained by the requirement of exhaustion of 
administrative remedies. A “court may review a final order of removal only if . . . the 
                                              
4 Currently pending before us are the Government’s June 30, 2017 and December 29, 
2018 Motions to Dismiss, which also address subject-matter jurisdiction. In light of our 
decision here, those motions are moot. 
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alien has exhausted all administrative remedies available to the alien as of right.” 8 
U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1). “[A]n alien is required to raise and exhaust his or her remedies as to 
each claim or ground for relief if he or she is to preserve the right of judicial review of 
that claim.” Abdulrahman, 330 F.3d at 594–95 (citing Alleyne v. INS, 879 F.2d 1177, 
1182 (3d Cir. 1989)). Special rules apply, however, to due process claims. Exhaustion “is 
not always required when the petitioner advances a due process claim.” Kahn v. Attorney 
Gen., 448 F.3d 226, 236 n.8 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Sewak v. INS, 900 F.2d 667, 670 (3d 
Cir. 1990)). But merely because an argument is couched “in the language of procedural 
due process” does not qualify it for this exception. Bonhometre v. Gonzales, 414 F.3d 
442, 448 (3d Cir. 2005). If the argument, stripped of its due process language, could have 
been made before and adjudicated by the BIA, then it must be exhausted as any other 
claim. See id. 
Mr. Okorafor contends the due process claim did not “mature until the BIA ruled 
on the CAT claim.” Pet’r’s Reply Br. 5.5 Mr. Okorafor is incorrect, as he argues within 
the same paragraph that the BIA could have corrected this alleged error by the IJ. He did 
not assert these alleged due process errors before the BIA. As such, the argument does 
not fall within the small category of cases exempt from the requirement of administrative 
                                              
5 Mr. Okorafor also asserts that his due process right was violated because the IJ did not 
give him “notice of what corroboration will be expected,” Chukwu v. Attorney Gen., 484 
F.3d 185, 192 (3d Cir. 2007), before the IJ ruled. Toure v. Attorney Gen., 443 F.3d 310, 
323-24 (3d Cir. 2006). The IJ’s failure, however, did not prejudice Okorafor. See Fadiga 
v. Attorney Gen., 488 F.3d 142, 155 (3d Cir. 2007). The IJ found Okorafor presented 
adequate facts on some issues and “assum[ed] that everything [Okorafor] indicated is 
true,” and as a result, the IJ’s conclusion did not rest on the absence of any corroborative 
evidence it found Okorafor failed to offer. J.A. 45. 
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exhaustion because it could have been addressed and remedied by the BIA. Accordingly, 
we will dismiss this petition in its entirety for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. 
